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securities, and banking law decided during the survey period by the
Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court, the United States
district courts in Georgia and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. Additionally, the Article highlights certain enactments
by the Georgia General Assembly revising the Georgia Corporate Code.
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CORPORATIONS

Piercingthe CorporateVeil
The concept of piercing the corporate veil to hold shareholders
personally liable for the debts of a corporation has been used by the
Georgia courts in an attempt to avoid injustices. Unfortunately, the
variety of fact situations coupled with legal principles used in these
cases, which are undefined and often not applied, has encouraged
disappointed trial court contestants to appeal hoping for a more
favorable review. The unprincipled results of these cases cry out for
guidance in this area.'
The Georgia courts generally frame the issue as whether the
corporation is the alter ego or business conduit of its owner.2 To
establish this, the courts require a showing that the shareholder's
disregard of the corporate entity made it a mere instrumentality for the
transfer of its own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and
ownership that the separate personality of the corporation and the
owner no longer exist; and that to adhere to the doctrine of a separate
corporate entity would promote injustice or protect fraud.' This
determination is a jury question in Georgia.4 For the issue to be
submitted to a jur, Georgia courts require evidence that the corporate
arrangement is a sham used to defeat justice, to perpetuate fraud, or to
evade statutory, contractual, or tort responsibility'
In Brown v. Rentz,6 the court of appeals addressed claims of negligent
construction and negligent misrepresentation in the sale of a residence.7
The Browns brought these claims against Rentz Builders, Inc., Lonnie
Rentz, the sole shareholder, director and president of Rentz Builders,
and Linda Rentz, its corporate secretary and listing and selling agent for
the house in question.8 The trial court granted summary judgment to
both Lonnie and Linda Rentz, individually, and the Browns appealed. 9

A.

1. See Paul A. Quir6s & Donna Ruth Jones, Business Associations,40 MERCER L. REV.
61, 68 (1988).
2. Amason v. Whitehead, 186 Ga. App. 320, 367 S.E.2d 107 (1988); Hickman v. Hyzer,
261 Ga. 38, 401 S.E.2d 738 (1991); Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, 194 Ga. App.
840, 392 S.E.2d 37 (1990).

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.

6.
7.
8.
9.

212 Ga. App. 275, 441 S.E.2d 876 (1994).
Id. at 275, 441 S.E.2d at 877.
Id.
Id.
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The Browns contended that the house they purchased from Rentz
Builders had structural problems, including a leaking roof and a flooded
basement. Lonnie Rentz responded to their complaints by sending
subcontractors to attempt to repair these problems, but the Browns
eventually hired other contractors to repair the defects.'0
The Browns argued that the Rentzes made knowing and false
misrepresentations that Rentz Builders had constructed the house
properly, using materials of good quality. Rentz Builders had no assets
by this time, and Lonnie Rentz continued his construction activities in
another corporate entity."
The trial court stated that the Browns failed to present evidence that
either Lonnie or Linda Rentz, in their individual capacities, participated
in the sale or disregarded the corporate entity of Rentz Builders in the
transaction. 2 On appeal, the Browns argued that the individual
defendants disregarded the corporate entity with respect to the
construction and sale of the house, which would allow the court to pierce
the corporate veil and hold individual defendants liable. 13
The court of appeals decided that Linda Rentz should be protected by
the "inherent purpose of incorporation [of] insulation from liability."4
The court of appeals reiterated its piercing analysis by stating that a
corporation is an entity distinct from its shareholders, and to pierce the
corporate veil, there must be some abuse of the corporate form. 5 Sole
ownership and control of a corporation is not a factor in the piercing
analysis unless the separate personalities of the sole shareholder and the
corporation cease to exist.'6 Linda Rentz chose paint colors, hung
wallpaper, and paid bills relating to the construction of the house. The
court of appeals refused to find that this minimal role indicated either
commingling of corporate and personal funds or disregard of the
corporate form so as to allow piercing."
The court of appeals next addressed the role of Lonnie Rentz.
Although it disallowed piercing of the corporate veil because Rentz did
not construct the house in his individual capacity, it held Lonnie Rentz
personally liable, as a corporate officer, for either participating in the

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 276, 441 S.E.2d at 877.
14. Id.
15. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 877-78 (quoting Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, 194 Ga.
App. 840, 844, 392 S.E.2d 37(1990)).
16. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 877.
17. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 879 (quoting Fuda v. Kroen, 204 Ga. App. 836,837-9, 420 S.E.2d
767 (1992)).
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corporation's commission of a tort or directing its activities with respect
to a tort.18 The court of appeals noted that Lonnie Rentz supervised
the subcontractors, performed certain small tasks on the house during
its construction, personally responded to the Browns' complaints, and
performed some of the repair work.'9 The court of appeals decided
that, given these facts and his status as an officer of the corporation, a
jury could also find Lonnie Rentz personally liable for the negligent
construction "because he specifically directed the manner in which the
house was constructed or participated or cooperated in its negligent
construction.' 2°
In her concurrence, Presiding Judge Beasley stated that the majority
reached the right result with respect to Lonnie Rentz but for reasons
that the Browns did not raise in their complaint.2 ' The Browns argued
that the corporate veil should be pierced because Lonnie Rentz was
involved in the construction of the house, and Judge Beasley believed
that some evidence existed that the corporation served as his alter ego
and business conduit.22
The decision in this case reflects the court of appeal's continued
reluctance to pierce the corporate veil in negligent construction cases.
Instead, the court searched for another cause of action to reach the same
result of imposing personal liability on a corporate shareholder and
officer. The court's analysis represents this reluctance, and Judge
Beasley noted that the court stepped in to recharacterize the plaintiffs'
arguments to reach a just result while refusing to subject the facts to a
piercing analysis.' This case continues the Georgia courts' retrenchment from the decision in Hickman v. Hyzer" and indicates an
increasingly favorable reception to pleadings that include alternative
causes of action that avoid a piercing analysis.'m

18. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 878 (quoting Cherry v. Ward, 204 Ga. App. 833, 834, 420 S.E.2d
763 (1992)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 277, 441 S.E.2d at 878 (quoting Cherry v. Ward, 204 Ga. App. 833, 834, 420
S.E.2d 763 (1992)).
21. Id. at 277-78, 441 S.E.2d at 878-79.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 261 Ga. 38,41,401 S.E.2d 738,740(1991), vacated by Hyzer v. Hickman, 200 Ga.
App. 478, 409 S.E.2d 93 (1991). See also Paul A. Quir6s & Lynn Schutte Scott, Business
Associations, 45 MERCER L, REV. 53, 55 (1993); Paul A. Quir6s & Lynn Scott Magruder,
Business Associations, 44 MERCER L. REV. 67, 68 (1992); and Paul A. Quir6s & Lynn Scott
Magruder, Business Associations, 43 MERCER L. REv. 85, 86 (1991).
25. In Cherry v. Ward, 204 Ga. App. 833, 420 S.E.2d 763 (1992), the court of appeals
reached a similar result in a negligent construction case. See Paul A. Quir6s & Lynn
Schutte Scott, Business Associations, 45 MERCER L. REV. 53, 55 (1993).
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In Matter of Adventure Bound Sports," the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia allowed piercing of the
corporate veil based on commingling of assets and the failure of a
shareholder to operate the corporate entity as separate from himself.'
This case involved two experienced scuba divers who died in an accident
off the Savannah coast.s The captain of the boat decided to dive with
the customers and left the diving instructor in charge of the boat.29
Due to a miscalculation by the diving instructor, the boat drifted out of
position and the divers were caught in the idling engine.3' Andre
Smith, the sole shareholder and officer of Adventure Bound Sports, Inc.
("Adventure Bound"), knew that the captain and diving instructor
sometimes reversed roles on diving expeditions." The district court
found that Smith operated Adventure Bound as a sole proprietorship,
indicated by his commingling of personal and corporate funds and his
failing to distinguish Adventure Bound as a corporate entity in his
banking relationships.3 2 Additionally, the accident occurred in June
1989 and Adventure Bound had been administratively dissolved in
March 1988.' Smith applied for reinstatement of the corporate status
of Adventure Bound in November 1989.' The district court found that
Smith reinstated the corporate entity solely to avoid liability for the
accident.35
The district court pierced the corporate veil and held Smith personally
liable based on evidence that Smith abused the corporate form by
disregarding the separateness of the corporation through his commingling of assets' and using the corporate entity to evade tort liability.3 7 This case presents facts flagrant enough to allow the court to
apply a piercing analysis without the need to explore other options."
In Fulton PaperCo. v. Reeves,3 9 the court of appeals determined that
the administrative dissolution of a corporation did not allow piercing of

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

837 F. Supp. 1244 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
Id. at 1256.
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1246-47.
Id.
Id. at 1248.

32. Id.

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1256.
Id. (quoting Earnest v. Merck, 183 Ga. App. 271, 358 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1987)).

37. Id. (quoting Kelly v. Austell Bldg. Supply, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 322, 297 S.E.2d 292,
297 (1982)).

38. Id.
39.

212 Ga. App. 314, 441 S.E.2d 881 (1994).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

the corporate veil.' Reeves served as president of May Fresh Services,
Inc., a Georgia corporation which was administratively dissolved in
January 1992.41 Subsequent to the dissolution, May Fresh could
continue to exist solely to wind-up and liquidate its business. 42 Reeves,
however, continued business as usual on behalf of May Fresh and
purchased paper goods from Fulton Paper Company on the May Fresh
account.' The court of appeals found these activities inconsistent with
the wind-up of May Fresh's business." Fulton Paper brought suit for
payment against Reeves doing business as May Fresh, and Reeves
denied personal liability."' In August 1992, May Fresh applied for
reinstatement of its corporate status pursuant to Section 14-2-1422 of
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").4 The trial court
refused to find Reeves personally liable for May Fresh's debts and
determined that reinstatement required the treatment of May Fresh as
an existing corporation for purposes of the lawsuit.4

Proper reinstate-

ment related back to the effective date of administrative dissolution as
if it had never occurred."
The court of appeals affirmed but based its decision on the continuation of corporate existence after administrative dissolution.4 9 The court
of appeals refused to impose personal liability on Reeves through an
agency', ultra vires5 l , or piercing5 2 analysis. The court of appeals
found that Fulton Paper dealt with May Fresh as a corporate entity at
all times; consequently, there was no abuse of form to allow application
of a piercing analysis.'

40. Id. at 317, 441 S.E.2d at 884.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 315, 441 S.E.2d at 883.
Id.
Id., 441 S.E.2d at 883-84.
Id. at 316, 441 S.E.2d at 884.
Id.

46. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1422 (1982)).

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1421(c) (1982)).
50. Id. at 317, 441 S.E.2d at 884 (citing O.C.G.A. § 10-6-89 (1982); Don Swann Sales
Corp. v. Echols, 160 Ga. App. 539, 287 S.E.2d 577 (1981)).
51. Id. at 317, 441 S.E.2d at 884 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-304 (1982)).
52. Id. at 318, 441 S.E.2d at 885 (citing Amason v. Whitehead, 186 Ga. App. 320, 367
S.E.2d 107 (1988)).
53. Id. at 317-18, 441 S.E.2d at 885.
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B. Administrative Dissolution Issues
In two cases, the courts reviewed issues regarding the rights of
corporations to maintain lawsuits after dissolution. 4 In Gas Pump,
Inc. v. General Cinema Beverages,' the Eleventh Circuit determined
that an administratively dissolved corporation could not maintain a
federal antitrust lawsuit or assign its claim to the sole shareholder after
its two year period for reinstatement had expired. 6 In March 1991,
Gas Pump alleged illegal price fixing by General Cinema Beverages and
another bottling company. Gas Pump was administratively dissolved in
May 1988 for failure to pay fees and file required reports.57 In a case
of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit certified to the supreme court
the question of whether an administratively dissolved corporation
continues its existence after dissolution to allow it to maintain a federal
antitrust lawsuit."8 The supreme court noted that such a corporation
continues its existence to liquidate and wind-up its affairs and has a two
year period to seek reinstatement. 59 The supreme court rejected Gas
Pump'%argument that a corporation can continue indefinitely to wind-up
its affairs.' The supreme court read sections of the O.C.G.A. together"' to determine that an administratively dissolved corporation can
continue its activities to wind-up and liquidate its business during the
two year period in which it can seek reinstatement, after which time the
failure to seek reinstatement prevents the initiation of any activity,
including maintaining a lawsuit.62
In Tilett Bros. Construction Co. v. Department of Transportation,'
the court of appeals held that a Tennessee corporation, which had its
certificate of authority to transact business in Georgia revoked in 1989,
could maintain a lawsuit filed in 1991 as a renewal of a lawsuit
originally filed in 1985." The Department of Transportation ("DOT")
argued that no order had been entered in the 1985 case and therefore

54. Gas Pump, Inc. v. General Cinema Beverages, 12 F.3d 181 (11th Cir. 1994); Tillett
Bros. Constr. Co. v. Department of Transp., 210 Ga. App. 84, 435 S.E.2d 241 (1993).
65. 12 F.3d 181 (11th Cir. 1994).

56. Id. at 183.
57. Id. at 182.
58. Id. at 184 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1421(c) (1982)).
59. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1422(a) (1982)).
60. Id. at 183-84.
61. Id. at 184 (comparing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1421 (1982), § 14-2-1422 (1982), and O.C.GA.
§ 14-2-1405 (1982)).
62. Id.
63. 210 Ga. App. 84, 435 S.E.2d 241 (1993).
64. Id. at 85, 435 S.E.2d at 244.
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the renewal action was not filed within the allowed period. The court of
appeals determined that the trial judge in the original case had entered
an order placing the case on an inactive list and that the renewal action
was timely filed.6 DOT argued that Tillett Brothers Construction
Company had no certificate of authority to transact business in 1991
when it filed the renewal action because of the revocation in 1989.6
The court of appeals determined that Tillett Brothers possessed a valid
certificate at all times when it transacted business in Georgia and in
1985, when it filed the original lawsuit, to allow it to maintain the
present action after revocation of the certificate. 7 DOT argued that,
although Tillett Brothers existed as a Tennessee corporation at the time
the events subject to the lawsuit occurred, it did not exist as an active
corporation when it filed the lawsuit. The court of appeals assumed that
Tillett Brothers had been dissolved under Tennessee law and reasoned
that both Georgia and Tennessee statutes" allowed continuance of
existence to wind-up and liquidate a corporation's affairs, which
included, in this case, pursuing the present lawsuit.69
These cases serve as a reminder that corporations and their attorneys
must pay close attention to annual filing and fee requirements in order
to continue uninterrupted corporate existence and the benefits and
protections thereof.
C. GuarantyIssues
In Davis v.Concord Commercial Corp.,7" the court of appeals held
that a successor corporation is entitled to enforce a personal guaranty of
a corporate debt.7" Davis, acting as president of Benafuels, Inc.,
guaranteed its debt to Ingersoll-Rand Financial Corporation ("IRFC").
The guaranty agreement covered all payments of Benafuel's liabilities
to IRFC whether created directly or otherwise acquired by IRFC. The
agreement expressly included IRFC's successors and assigns. Davis
could terminate his responsibility for Benafuels liabilities to IRFC by
giving written notice. 2

65. Id. at 84, 435 S.E.2d at 243.

66. Id. at 86,435 S.E.2d at 244.
67. Id. (citing O.C.GA. § 14-2-1502 (1982)).
68. Id. at 87, 435 S.E.2d at 245 (citing O.C.GA. § 14-2-1421 (1982) and Tenn. Code
Ann. §48-24-105 (1988)).
69. Id. at 88, 435 S.E.2d at 245.

70. 209 Ga. App. 595, 434 S.E.2d 571 (1993).
71. 1d. at 597, 434 S.E.2d at 573.

72. Id. at 595, 434 S.E.2d at 572.
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Concord Commercial Corporation ("CCC") acquired all of the stock of
IRFC and sued Davis on the guaranty after nonpayment of the debts by
Benafuels. Davis argued that IRFC had assigned the assets subject to
the guaranty to a subsidiary; therefore, IRFC was not a creditor of
Benafuels." The court of appeals found that IRFC acquired a debt
obligation of Benafuels through IRFC's sole ownership of the subsidiary
and became a creditor by assignment or otherwise as allowed under the
terms of the guaranty.74 CCC succeeded to all interests of IRFC
of its stock, including the right to enforce the
through acquisition
6
guaranty
In Morris & Manning InsuranceAgency, Inc. v. Morris,76 the court of
appeals held that a guaranty of a corporate obligation could not be
voided by arguing that the transaction subject to the guaranty rendered
the corporation insolvent in violation of the O.C.G.A.7 7 Morris agreed
to sell his majority interest in the corporation to the other two shareholders, Manning and Nozick. Manning, Nozick, and their wives
personally guaranteed the payment of a corporate promissory note for
the stock. 78 Manning insisted that the transaction be structured before
redeeming Morris' stock by the corporation. Morris' attorney warned
him that the stock redemption would be valid only if the transaction did
not render the corporation insolvent.79
In March 1991, the corporation ceased payments to Morris even
though Manning and Nozick continued to draw substantial salaries and
pay all other corporate debts. Morris sued on the personal guaranties,
and defendants argued that the guaranties were unenforceable because
the stock redemption had rendered the corporation insolvent and the
parties could void them.'
The court of appeals found that its decision in Hullender v. Acts II,
Inc.,"1 controlled, precluding defendants' arguments. The court of
appeals concluded that even if a corporation is rendered insolvent by a
transaction, allowing the transaction to be voided, a guarantor "is not
entitled to invoke the illegality of the obligation underlying the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 596-97, 434 S.E.2d at 573.
Id. at 596, 434 S.E.2d at 573.
Id.
211 Ga. App. 433, 439 S.E.2d 660 (1993).
Id. at 436, 439 S.E.2d at 662.
Id. at 434, 439 S.E.2d at 661.
Id. See also O.C.GA. § 14-2-640 (1982).
211 Ga. App. at 435, 439 S.E.2d at 661.
153 Ga. App. 119, 264 S.E.2d 486 (1980).
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[promissory] note and thereby avoid liability as a personal guarantor.' 2
The court of appeals did not concede the insolvency of the corporation in
this case, but applied Hulender to decide that those who caused and
benefitted from the wrong could not then argue its illegality as a
defense.'
D. Advancement of Directors'Expenses
In Service Corp. International v. H.M. Patterson & Son, Inc., the
supreme court addressed the advancement of directors' expenses in a
shareholder derivative suit." Service Corporation International ("SCI")
brought suit against Patterson, its directors, and its officers claiming
fraud, mismanagement, and usurpation of corporate opportunity.' SCI
later attempted to prevent Patterson from advancing funds to its
directors for expenses incurred in the lawsuit because the directors had
not complied with the provisions of the O.C.G.A.'
The applicable
provisions allow advancement if a director furnishes the corporation with
a written affirmation of the director's good faith belief that he has met
the required standards of conduct in his actions, and the director
provides a written undertaking to repay the advances if it is ultimately
determined that he could not be indemnified. 7 SCI argued that the
O.C.G.A.'s director conflict of interest requirements, mandating that an
interested director transaction be fair to the shareholders, should also
be applied to advancement decisions.' The supreme court refused to
countenance this argument because the advancement provisions
recognize the inherent self-interest of a corporation's directors and
therefore do not require a fairness determination by the board of
directors or shareholders to allow advancement of expenses.8 9
The supreme court refused to allow comments to the O.C.G.A. to
require a decision that the advancement of expenses section be read in

82. 211 Ga. App. at 436, 439 S.E.2d at 662 (citing Hullender v. Acts II, 153 Ga. App.
119, 122, 264 S.E.2d 486, 488 (1980)).
83. Id.
84. 263 Ga. 412, 434 S.E.2d 455 (1993).
85. Id. at 412, 439 S.E.2d at 456.
86. Id. (citing O.C.GA. § 14-2-853(a) (1982)).
87. Id. at 413, 434 S.E.2d at 456 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-2-853(a) (1982)). The
standards of conduct are acting in a manner believed in good faith to be in, or not opposed
to, the best interests of the corporation. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-851(a) (1982).
88. 263 Ga. at 414, 434 S.E.2d at 457 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-860 to -864 (1982)).
89. Id. at 415, 434 S.E.2d at 458 (citing Comment to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-861 (1982)). The
court noted that it did not agree that Comments control interpretations given to provisions
of the O.C.G.A. or precludes its rules of statutory construction. Id.
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conjunction with the conflict of interest section.90 The supreme court
correctly recognizedr that the advancement of expenses to directors
represents an inherent conflict of interest, which is addressed by the
undertaking to repay advances if required. 9 In McKoon v. Jones,'
the supreme court also refused to find comments to the O.C.G.A.
controlling even if the comments have some binding authority."
E.

ShareholderDerivative Action

Several years ago, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia applying Georgia law considered the role of an
independent litigation committee of the board of directors of the
Southern Company in Peller v. Southern Co.94 This litigation committee determined that the demand in question should be dismissed. Peller
argued that the committee was not independent due to structural bias
involving its similar background with the directors whose actions the
committee reviewed.9' The district court decided to adopt the test set
forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in Zapata v. Maldonado"
This
governing an independent litigation committee's decision.97
procedure requires an examination of the independence and good faith
of the committee and the reasonableness of its investigation.9"
In another shareholder derivative action involving Southern, the
Eleventh Circuit considered two issues on appeal in Stepak v. Addison.99 Pursuant to Delaware law, Stepak made a demand on the board
of directors that the company bring suit for breach of fiduciary duties by
certain directors and officers of Southern which allegedly caused
company losses. The board refused Stepak's demand, and Stepak and
another shareholder filed a shareholder derivative suit alleging that the
board had wrongfully refused Stepak's demand. ° ° The district court
dismissed the complaint and the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
214 Ga. App. 40, 447 S.E.2d 50 (1994).
Id. at 41, 447 S.E.2d at 51.
707 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ga. 1988). For a thorough discussion of this case see

Paul A. Quir6s & Michael L. Chapman, 41 MERCER L. REV. 45 (1989).
95. 707 F. Supp. at 527-28.

96. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
97. Id. at 788.
98. 20 F.3d 398 (11th Cir. 1994).

99. Id. at 400.
100. Id. at 401.
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court's decision concerning Stepak but affirmed the dismissal concerning
the other shareholder, Mondschein. 1° '
The court of appeals found Stepak alleged facts creating a reasonable
doubt that the outside directors, who considered his demand, had
conducted a reasonable investigation or acted in good faith by refusing
his demand as required by Zapata. 2 Stepak alleged that Southern
improperly deducted certain items as expenses that should have been
treated as inventory and that certain misleading information had been
contained in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission."
The court of appeals applied Delaware law to this issue because
Southern is a Delaware corporation.'04 Georgia courts and federal
district courts applying Georgia law often look to Delaware law on
shareholder derivative issues;' 6 therefore, the authors decided to
include the court's analysis in this article. Delaware law requires a
shareholder to demand the board to act, and the courts will not disturb
a board's rejection of a demand unless such rejection is wrongful.'
A court will find a wrongful refusal when the refusal did not constitute
the board's valid exercise of its business judgment. 10 7 The business
judgment rule protects a board's decisions by presuming that they are
made independently, in good faith, and on an informed basis. 0 8 To
overcome this presumption, a shareholder must allege facts to question
that the refusal was made in good faith, on an informed basis, and in the
09
company's best interests."
The court of appeals focused on the reasonableness of the board's
investigation and noted the directors' duty to properly inform themselves
before making a business decision."' Stepak alleged that the directors
"were merely passive recipients of the product of an 'investigation'
orchestrated by Southern's [general] counsel," which also defended the
officers and directors in criminal investigations involving the same
allegations as the present lawsuit, representing an unreasonable conflict
of interest in the conduct and subject matter of the investigation."

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 411.
Id. at 402 (citing Zapata Corp. v. Maldonaldo, 430 A.2d at 784-86).
Id. at 400.
Id. at 402.
See Peller v. Southern Co., 707 F. Supp. at 525.
20 F.3d at 403 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)).
Id.
Id. at 403 (citing Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 211 (Del. 1991)).
Id. (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985)).
Id. (quoting paragraph 97 of Stepak's complaint).
Id. at 403-04.
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The court of appeals first considered whether a law firm's domination
of a board's consideration of a shareholder demand raises a reasonable
doubt that the board failed to properly inform itself before rejecting the
demand since the firm represented the directors in criminal proceedings
based on the same subject matter. 2 The court of appeals decided that
such domination would raise a reasonable doubt and concluded that
Stepak's complaint alleged facts sufficient to indicate such domination."" The court of appeals analogized the facts in this case to
instances involving successive dual representation and determined that
a law firm's representation of "alleged wrongdoers in criminal investigations is clearly incompatible with its simultaneous handling of a
reasonable and neutral investigation of their conduct on behalf of the
corporation."" 4 The court of appeals also noted that certain confidentiality duties of the law firm to the criminal defendants would render the
law firm not independent with respect to the same subject matter of the
criminal investigations and a conflict of interest therefore existed."5
The court stated that it might have been proper for the law firm to
participate in the investigation, but it was improper for the firm to
conduct the investigation." These considerations led the court to find
that Stepak raised a reasonable doubt that the board's rejection of his
demand was based on an informed decision protected by the business
judgment rule; consequently, the court concluded his complaint was
entitled to survive a motion to dismiss on a wrongful refusal argument." 7 The board did not meet its affirmative duty under Delaware
law to conduct a reasonable investigation before rejecting a shareholder's
demand." 8 The court of appeals addressed the second issue by
determining that Mondschein's failure to make a demand on the board,
as required by Delaware law, could not be excused as futile." 9 The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's analysis that plaintiffs
cannot attempt to "cover all of the bases" by having one shareholder
make a demand and another allege the futility of such a demand. 20

112. Id,
113, Id. at 404.
114. Id. at 405.
115. Id. at 409-10.
116. Id. at 410.
117. Id. at 407.
118. Id. at 410 (citing Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 174, 213 (Del. 1991)).
119. Id. at 411.
120. Id. at 412 (citing Boeing Co. v. Shrontz, No. 11273, 1992 WL 81228 (Del. Ch. April
20, 1992)).
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PARTNERSHIPS

Existence of Partnerships
In Clark v. Schwartz,12 1 the court of appeals determined that a
partnership did not exist because plaintiff presented no evidence
indicating a meeting of the minds with respect to one essential term of
Schwartz argued that he had entered
the partnership agreement."
into a partnership for the practice of law with Clark & Smith, P.C. and
sought judgment for the value of his partnership interest. The court of
appeals overturned a jury verdict in favor of Schwartz by determining
as a matter of law that no partnership existed between the parties. 2 '
The court noted that a partnership arises from a contract, which can be
express or implied,' but that a contract is not enforceable without a
meeting of minds on its essential terms." In this case, the parties
failed to agree on Schwartz's exact percentage of interest in the law
A.

firm.l 26

The court stated that evidence failed to support an equal

division because Clark & Smith, P.C. retained a disproportionate share,
ownership percentage could not be determined from
and this essential
7
the evidence.12

In this case, the court recognized that partnerships are creatures of
contract law and the required elements of contract law must be
addressed either in the partnership agreement or the arrangements
among the parties to be able to value a partnership interest.2
However, as discussed below, when examining the relationship between
parties with a profit motive but without a formal structure, the courts
are often willing to find that a partnership exists.
In Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Coburn,'12 the court of appeals
determined that a partnership might have existed in a scheme to profit
Coburn purchased a house and lot and
from the sale of a house.'
executed a note to Great Western Mortgage Company. Coburn sold the

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
S.E.2d
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

210 Ga. App. 678, 436 S.E.2d 759 (1993).
Id. at 679, 436 S.E.2d at 760.
Id.
Id. (citing Huggins v. Huggins, 117 Ga. 151, 155, 43 S.E. 759 (1903)).
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-3-2 (1982); Reichard v. Reichard, 262 Ga. 561, 564, 423
241 (1992)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
211 Ga. App. 357, 439 S.E.2d 69 (1993).
Id. at 358, 439 S.E.2d at 70.
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property to a corporate entity which immediately sold it to another
individual."3 ' This individual gave a note to Fulton Federal Savings
and Loan Association, and Stewart Title certified the priority of this
note. Coburn failed to pay off the Great Western note, and the ultimate
purchaser defaulted on its note to Fulton Federal. 13 2 Stewart Title
purchased the Great Western note giving Fulton Federal first priority."' Fulton Federal foreclosed on the property and sold it. Stewart
Title proceeded to sue Coburn and Willard on the Great Western note.
Willard had shared in the proceeds of the original sale of the property
and had arranged for the Coburn loan from Great Western."3 The
court of appeals decided that although Willard did not execute the Great
Western note, its execution furthered the goals of a partnership between
The court of appeals reasoned that Coburn
Coburn and Willard.'
partnership and Willard as a
executed the note as an agent of 3the
6
partner could be liable for the loan.'
Violation of Limited PartnershipAgreement
In Moore v. Barge,3 ' the court of appeals found violations of limited
partnership agreements which interfered with the compensation terms
of an employment contract by misallocating partnership funds. 3
Moore had an oral employment agreement with Charter Properties, Inc.
from which he received a salary and equity interest (usually ten percent)
in certain limited partnerships formed by Barge, Wagener, and Lesley,
the owners of Charter (together "Barge"). Moore argued that in violation
of the limited partnership agreements, Barge paid itself fees for undocumented services, took larger cash distributions than allowed by their
percentage interests, made interest free loans to entities owned by
Barge, and paid Charter Properties undocumented fees. 39 The court
of appeals stated that sufficient evidence existed to create a question of
fact concerning the direct causal connection between alleged violations
of the limited partnership agreements and Moore's claim of tortious
interference140with his employment contract to remand the case to the
trial court.

A.

131. Id. at 357, 439 S.E.2d at 69.

132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id. at 357-58, 439 S.E.2d at 70.
Id. at 359, 439 S.E.2d at 71.
Id. at 360, 439 S.E.2d at 71.

136. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-8-9 (1982)).

137. 210 Ga. App. 552, 436 S.E.2d 746 (1993).
138. Id. at 556, 436 S.E.2d at 750.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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Moore claimed a unique method to value his limited partnership
interests: interference with his rights to compensation under his
employment agreement based on his limited partnership interests,
rather than the usual suit for an accounting of the limited partnership.

III, BANKs AND BANKING
A

Letter of Credit Issues
In an unusual geographical case, the court of appeals addressed letter
of credit issues in Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro v. SMS Hasenclever,
GmbH." SMS Hasenclever, GmbH ("SMS") filed suit against Banca
Nazionale Del Lavoro ("BNL") alleging that BNL wrongfully dishonored
letters of credit issued by the Central Bank of Iraq ("CBI") for which
BNL issued confirmation certificates.142 SMS agreed to sell certain
machines to an Iraqi company, and BNL agreed to pay SMS sixty
percent of the value of the machinery upon receiving documentation
proving its shipment to Iraq, ten percent upon receiving documentation
proving its arrival, and ten percent upon receiving documentation
proving its acceptance.'
SMS presented shipping documents to BNL which contained antiIsraeli certifications. 1 "
BNL responded that such language was
contrary to United States export laws and requested SMS to present new
documents. SMS could not comply and BNL refused to pay.'
The
court of appeals stated that on a letter of credit, a confirming bank is
directly obligated to the extent of its confirmation as if it were the issuer
of the letter of credit. 46 SMS complied with the terms of its agreements, but BNL argued that the anti-Israeli language might violate a
federal statute and impair its right to collect from CBI. 47 The court
determined that BNL's future problems concerning reimbursement from
CBI failed to negate its direct obligation on the letter of credit as the
confirming bank.'

141. 211 Ga. App. 360, 439 S.E.2d 502 (1993).
142. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 11-5-107 (1994)).
143. Id. at 361, 439 S.E.2d at 502. The court did not address the payment of the
remaining twenty percent. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 503.
146. Id. at 362, 439 S.E.2d at 503 (citing O.C.GA. § 11-5-107 (1994)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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B. Duties of Banks
In Russell Corp. v. BancBoston FinancialCo.,'4 the court of appeals
refused to find a fiduciary relationship between the borrowers and the
bank or support for claims of fraud, duress, coercion, or intentional
interference with business relations.'
Russell Corporation and Gulf
South Petroleum, Inc. (together, the "Companies") established a
revolving line of credit with BancBoston Financial, partially secured by
inventory, account receivables, and certain real property. The Companies used advances from the line of credit to pay suppliers and acquire
additional real property and routinely issued, checks in excess of the
amounts available under the line of credit.15 '
In December 1989, the Companies and BancBoston modified the line
of credit to adjust amounts available thereunder contingent upon an
appraisal of the Companies' real property holdings.'" After receiving
this appraisal, BancBoston decided that the Companies had exceeded
their, credit limit by over two million dollars and demanded immediate
payment of the excess amount. The Companies did not pay and
BancBoston declared the entire debt in default and began foreclosure
proceedings.153
The court of appeals stated that the original agreement between the
parties made all advances discretionary with BancBoston and all
overadvances in excess of the borrowing base amount payable on
demand.'
The modification agreement reiterated that BancBoston
had no obligation to fund or carry overadvances except under the agreed
upon terms. 5 The court of appeals found no special circumstances
imposing fiduciary duties upon BancBoston and no evidence of any
improper conduct by BancBoston in its assertion of its contractual rights
against the Companies."
In Tucker Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Rawlins, the court of
appeals examined a bank's duties to its customers."5 7 Elvin Rawlins
purchased a $100,000 certificate of deposit with his own funds from
Tucker Federal Savings and Loan and asked to have his nephew,

149. 209 Ga. App. 660, 434 S.E.2d 716 (1993).

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 662-63, 434 S.E.2d at 718.
Id. at 660, 434 S.E.2d at 717.
Id. at 661, 434 S.E.2d at 717.
Id. at 660, 434 S.E.2d at 717.
Id.
Id. at 661, 434 S.E.2d at 717.
Id. at 662-63, 434 S.E.2d at 718.

157.

209 Ga. App. 649, 434 S.E.2d 94 (1993).
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Campbell, added as a joint tenant. Rawlins and Campbell signed the
signature card.158 Several months later Rawlins returned to Tucker
Federal with his brother and asked the same employee to remove
Campbell's name and add hit brother's name. Because of interest
penalty issues, the employee suggested adding plaintiffs name as a joint
tenant and told the brothers that only the holder of the certificate could
withdraw funds, which would prevent Campbell from doing so.1"9
Rawlins died and Campbell went to Tucker Federal to withdraw the
funds. Campbell did not have the certificate in his possession, but the
same employee allowed him to withdraw funds after signing an affidavit
stating that he was a holder of a lost certificate."'I Plaintiff failed to
recover the funds from Campbell and sued Tucker Federal. The trial
court found for plaintiff, and Tucker Federal appealed, arguing it had no
duty to plaintiff because it disbursed the funds to the proper joint
tenant.6
Plaintiff argued that Tucker Federal failed to change
properly the ownership of the certificate of deposit, give the brothers
advice concerning how funds would be disbursed, and follow industry
practice to require more than a lost certificate affidavit to obtain
funds. 6 2
The court of appeals discussed the noncontractual duties that a bank
owes to both its customers and third party beneficiaries when handling
certificates of deposit and found no Georgia case addressing the
issue." The court of appeals held that a bank receiving funds from
a customer to purchase a certificate of deposit has a duty to issue and
modify the certificate as the customer requests and may be liable to the
customer or a third party beneficiary for mishandling the transaction.' The court of appeals also noted that banks must be knowledgeable concerning applicable laws and exercise ordinary care in such
transactions.'65
C. Other Banking Issues
In Bank of Spalding County v. Pound," the court of appeals found
that a bank, aware of an assignment of funds subject to its right of set-

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 649, 434 S.E.2d at 95.
Id. at 650, 434 S.E.2d at 95.
Id., 434 S.E.2d at 96.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 651, 434 S.E.2d at 96.
Id.
Id.
213 Ga. App. 324, 444 S.E.2d 375 (1994).
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off, could not assert that the assignee was subject to its set-off rights
against the original debtor.67 Pound sold its assets to Whitworth and
Wright, Inc. ("W&W"), and W&W failed to continue making required
installment payments to Pound. W&W later settled with Pound and
transferred assets and bank accounts back to Pound and gave the bank
notice of this assignment."6 The bank improperly attempted to set-off
W&W indebtedness against W&W funds that had been assigned to
Pound. The court of appeals noted that the bank could not set-off the
funds of one depositor against a debt owed by another depositor.'6 9
The Georgia courts also addressed issues concerning an allowed set-off
against the liability of a joint tenant on a: certificate of deposit, 7 ' the
lack of a confidential relationship between a bank and the guarantors of
a note,' 7' and the relationship between a borrower and a member of a
bank's board of directors, who allegedly embezzled the borrower's funds
while representing a third party. 7 ' In the latter case, the court of
appeals refused to find that the attorney was the alter ego of the
bank.

17

These cases indicate that the Georgia courts will closely examine
contractual and noncontractual relationships between banks and their
customers, but are unlikely to find a duty unless a bank's actions are
arguably outside reasonably expected conduct.
IV. SECURITIES
Definition of a Security
In Moss v. The State, 74 Moss appealed his conviction of violating the
Georgia Securities Act, by arguing that the transaction in question
175
involved an unsecured loan rather than a securities transaction.
Moss engaged in various transactions for a client as a Georgia licensed
stockbroker and registered securities salesman. He asked the client to

A.

167. Id. at 326, 444 S.E.2d at 377.
168. Id. at 324, 444 S.E.2d at 377.
169. Id. at 326, 444 S.E.2d at 378 (citing National City Bank v. Busbin, 175 Ga. App.
103, 105, 332 S.E.2d 678 (1985)).
170. Yates v. Trust Co. Bank of Middle Ga., 212 Ga. App. 438, 442 S.E.2d 293 (1994).
171. Dixie Diners Atlanta, Inc. v. Gwinnett Fed. Bank, FSB, 211 Ga. App. 364, 439
S.E.2d 53 (1993).
172. Macomber v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Ga., 212 Ga. App. 57, 441 S.E.2d 276
(1994).
173. Id. at 58, 441 S.E.2d at 278.
174. 209 Ga. App. 486, 433 S.E.2d 692 (1993).
175. Id. at 486, 433 S.E.2d at 693 (citing O.C.G.A. § 10-5-12 (1982)).
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participate in an investment pool promising a fifty percent profit.178
The client stated that she wished to invest only in stocks, but Moss
agreed to guarantee the fifty percent return in a notarized contract. She
allowed Moss to make the initial investment, and Moss later convinced
her to invest an additional sum. 1" When the client requested payment

for the original investment, Moss gave her a check which he asked her
to hold for a period of time. After several weeks Moss informed her that
her money was gone.178
The court of appeals stated that in order for an investment to be
considered a security under Georgia law, "there must be an investment,
a reasonable expectation of profit, and a reliance on the management of
others to achieve the profit."179 The court of appeals focused on Moss's

clients reliance upon other persons' managerial efforts to realize the
expected profits."s° The court of appeals found that the representations in the investment pool proposal and the other evidence presented
supported a finding that the investment constituted a security sold in
violation of Georgia law.181
The court of appeals applied the investment contract analysis to
determine that an investment in a pool promising a fifty percent return
is a security under Georgia law and the investor is entitled to the
protection of the Georgia securities laws.18" As discussed above, the
court of appeals focused on the investor's reliance on the skills of others
to make the promised profit rather than the reasonableness prong of the
investment contract analysis. 83 One might argue that the expectation
of profit in this case, a promised fifty percent return, did not satisfy the
reasonable expectation requirement, although it is unlikely that a court
would focus solely on this part of the investment contract analysis.
B.

Agreement to Arbitrate
In Wheat, First Securities v. Green,' the Eleventh Circuit decided
that a district court should determine whether an agreement to arbitrate
exists between a broker/dealer purchasing assets of another broker/dealer and the customers of such selling broker/dealer rather than
176. Id.

177. Id. at 487, 433 S.E.2d at 693.
178. Id,
179. Id. (citing Tech Resources v. Estate of Hubbard, 246 Ga. 583, 584, 272 S.E.2d 314
(1980)).
180. Id. (citing D.K. Properties v. Osborne, 143 Ga. App. 832, 240 S.E.2d 293 (1977)).

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 10-5-12(h) (1994); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
Id.
Id.
993 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1993).
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an arbitrator making this critical determination.'
Wheat, First
Securities acquired certain assets of Marshall & Co. Securities, Inc., but
specifically did not assume any liabilities of Marshall under its customer
contracts. The district court decided that Wheat First had no obligation
to arbitrate the claims of Marshall's customers because Wheat First did
not enter into a contract with those customers containing an arbitration
clause.'
The customers argued that the arbitrator, instead of the
district court, should determine the agreement of the parties to arbitrate.
They also argued that the code of the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") requires arbitration of "any dispute, claim or
controversy 18 7 and Wheat First, as a NASD member, must abide by
this requirement in all its dealings with customers.'
Alternatively,
these customers argued that Wheat First, as Marshall's successor-ininterest, acceded to their customer contracts containing the arbitration
clause.'89
The Eleventh Circuit admitted that a national policy favoring
arbitration exists, 19° but found that such policy does not require
parties to arbitrate absent an agreement to do sol9' and that a court
must determine if the parties had such an agreement.'92 The Eleventh
Circuit applied the two-pronged test that it adopted in Chastain v.
Robinson-Humphrey Co. '3 to determine whether a district court
should decide an arbitration question.'" First, the party trying to
avoid arbitration "must unequivocally deny that an agreement to
arbitrate was reached and [second,] must offer 'some evidence' to
substantiate the denial."'
The Eleventh Circuit also noted that in

185. Id. at 816.
186. Id.

187. Id (quoting NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure §§ 1 and 12(a)).
188. Id
189. Id. at 816-17.
190. Id. at 817 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)),

191. Id. (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
See also Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 864 (11th Cir. 1992).
192. 993 F.2d at 817 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)). See also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
193. 957 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1992).
194. 993 F.2d at 817.
195. Id. (quoting Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 937 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir.

1992)).
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Chastain,it refused to extend previous holdings'" to allow arbitrators
197
to determine a party's allegation that no contract existed at all.
The Eleventh Circuit next addressed an issue of first impression
concerning whether Wheat First's NASD membership required it to
arbitrate the claims in this case.198 NASD rules require that a customer relationship exist between the parties and that the claim have arisen
in connection with the member's business.'
The Eleventh Circuit
refused to follow the lead of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit2 °0 and decided that the customer status must be
determined at the time of the events in controversy and that these
customers were not customers of Wheat First at the time of the events
leading to their claim.2 ' The court did not reach the questions of
whether the claim arose in connection with Wheat Firsts business or the
sufficiency of Wheat First's membership in NASD to impose arbitration.'
An extension of a duty to arbitrate solely through NASD
membership would indicate a radical change from the Eleventh Circuit's
emphasis on contract analysis in arbitration matters.
V. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

During 1993 and 1994, the Georgia General Assembly passed
amendments to Article 9 of the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") to establish a central indexing system.0
New UCC filings
must include the debtor's social security number or Internal Revenue
Service taxpayer identification number.04 The 1993 amendments
include changes to filing requirements allowing financing statements to
be filed anywhere in the state rather than tying the filing requirement
to the location of the debtor or the collateral.2 5 In addition, certain
notice filings are allowed now with respect to real property related
collatera. 2 0 Because these amendments contain conflicting effective

196. Id. at 818 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967)).
197. Id. at 819 (quoting Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 937 F.2d 851, 854 (11th
Cir. 1992)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 820.
200. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 728 F.2d
577, 580 (2d Cir. 1984).
201. 993 F.2d at 820.
202. Id. at 821.
203. 1993 Ga. Laws 1550.
204. O.C.G.A. § 11-9-402 (1994).
205. Id. § 11-9-401.
206. See id. § 11-9-403.
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dates,0 7 many practitioners recommend coitinuing to file in the

locations currently required but also urge including identification
material.2
The Limited Liability Company Act became effective in Georgia on
March 1, 1994, so and many practitioners recommend their clients
examine the benefits of this type of entity for their business activities.
A description of the differences between corporations and limited
liability companies is beyond the scope of this article. The Georgia
courts did not review any issues with respect to this new form during
the survey period, but it will be interesting to examine future developments in this new area.

207. See 1993 Ga. Laws 1550, 1562; 1994 Ga. Laws 1693, 1696.
208. See Richard P. Kessler, Jr.,Reportfrom the Uniform CommercialCode Committee,
CORPORATE AND BANKING LAW SECTION NEWSLETTER, Summer 1994.
209. 1993 Ga. Laws 123 (codified as O.C.G.A. §§ 14-11-100 to -109 (1994)).

